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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The environmental movement is currently one of the 
most influential forces in political life. Despite initial 
successes, however, it has not yet clearly articulated its 
various goals. Until such an articulation is made, there 
is some justification to the charge that "everyone is an 
environmentalist." This paper will attempt to suggest how 
these various goals might be clarified, and why such a 
clarification is necessary.
The environmental movement is a subtle blend of two 
distinctly different impulses. One of those impulses is 
culturally prescriptive. Its goal is to reform those 
dominant cultural values requiring a highly consumptive 
life-style and its associated environmental impacts. A 
second impulse is to realize those existent cultural values 
which have traditionally held a natural environment in 
fairly high regard. The distinction just made is between 
promoting new values and effecting popular values which 
have been thwarted by unresponsive institutions.
This distinction may seem obscure when observing the 
day-to-day actions of environmentalists. The importance of 
making the distinction between reforming cultural values, 
and effecting existing ones becomes more apparent when one
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
reviews past American political movements, e.g., populism, 
progressivism, the New Deal, the Civil Rights and the anti­
war movements. All have been characterized by the subtle 
blend of prescriptive and popular impulses suggested above. 
Past movements have generally combined a disaffected 
general public with activist minorities whose own cultural 
values were distinct from those popular. The concern 
binding the two elements was their mutually injured 
interests, not a shared sense of values. The outcome of 
these movements was the demise of the more visionary minor­
ity soon after the interests of the larger public were 
secured and general interest in the once unifying issue 
waned.^ Historians have blamed the demise of the more 
visionary minority elements on their failure to clearly 
distinguish their own unique values from those of the 
disaffected general public. Instead of articulating those 
values, and clearly acting in their name, the minority 
elements were content to ride the coattails of the popular 
disaffection. When the general public’s disaffection ended, 
the visionary elements were unable to give their values 
adequate public expression.
Although the environmental movement is currently one 
of the most influential forces in American politics, it 
seems indifferent to the pitfalls which ended earlier move­
*Christopher Lasch, The Agony of the American Left 
(New York: Alfred A. KnopT^ 1969), p. 18.
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ments. The distinction between prescriptive and popular 
environmentalism is neither philosophically or sociologically 
clear. Until it explains what its alternative "environ­
mental values" are, and how they can be achieved, the . 
culturally prescriptive impulse of the environmental move­
ment seems likely to succumb to a fate similar to that of 
its counterparts in earlier movements.
This paper will use preservation controversies as a 
heuristic device for exploring the prescriptive and popular 
impulses in the environmental movement. It will argue 
that preservation controversies provide issues that, if 
properly perceived, prevent the prescriptive impulse of the 
environmental movement from being neglected.
How this is possible will be explained more fully in 
the following chapters. As a preview, the unique role of 
preservation issues within the environmental movement can 
be credited to their intractability. The visionary 
minority's hopes for preserving natural environments, and 
popular demands for increased consumption constitute two 
mutually exclusive demands within the same broad movement. 
Indeed, it is the only environmental issue which is divisive 
along prescriptive and popular lines. By forcing the 
distinction between the two impulses to be made, preser­
vation controversies force the visionary element of the 
environmental movement to come to grips with its own distinct 
values.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In summary, this paper has two chief objects. It hopes 
to analyze the larger environmental movement, and to explain 
the role of preservation within that larger movement.
Chapter Two will explore the ambiguous role played by 
preservation within the environmental movement. A review of 
the statements of various "environmentalists" suggests, 
for example, that some consider preservation a peripheral 
and vulnerable concern. This paper will argue that the 
resulting ambiguity has two causes: the failure of the 
environmentalists to recognize the existence of differing 
goals and principles within the environmental movement, and 
the failure of preservationists to construct a rational and 
consistent defense of their actions which keeps these 
differences in mind.
The following two chapters will explore these causes 
further. Chapter Three will discuss and criticize the 
philosophies of those who have criticized preservation, and 
suggest that those philosophies are themselves inadequate. 
Chapter Four will suggest the outlines of a rational and 
consistent defense of preservation. Finally, Chapter Five 
will reevaluate the role of preservation in the light of 
the discussions of Chapters Three and Four. Using historical 
analogies it will conclude that preservation should be seen 
as a central and relatively invulnerable concern of the 
environmental movement.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
It should be cautioned that these objects are not 
achieved through an empirical study of the environmental 
movement. What follows is an attempt to construct a 
conceptual framework which has proved useful in under­
standing past movements, and an application of that frame­
work to the environmental movement. A sociological study 
of the environmental movement which employs the distinctions 
developed here might be a promising project but is beyond 
the scope of this paper.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER II
PRESERVATION AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT
The chief concerns of the environmental movement have 
been focused on two broad sets of problems: the pollution
of landscape, air, and water, and the preservation of 
unique natural environments. Of these two problem areas, 
the former has received the bulk of public and scholarly 
attention.^ The latter, although occasionally provoking an 
emotional public debate, has, over the past several years, 
been shunted to the side of the larger environmental movement 
On Earth Day 1970, inaugural day for the modern wave of 
environmentalism, the preservation of urban and nonurban 
natural environments was not included on the roster of issues. 
This peripheral role was a far cry from the early 1960's, 
when preservation was a prominent component of the 
environmental movement.^
*John Warren Duffield, "Wilderness: A Political and 
Economic Analysis" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 
1974), p. 10.
^Michael McCloskey, "Wilderness Movement at the Cross­
roads, 1945-1970," Pacific Historical Review 41 (1972): 346 
353 (hereinafter cited as "Crossroads"). McCloskey traces 
the post-WWII rise of preservation sentiment to today when 
preservation "is a remote and unreal issue . . . generally 
there is no hostility toward it as a goal, but it is over­
whelmed in the competition for attention. It lacks novelty 
and tends to be considered a problem settled long ago. In 
short it has become an old issue to many who believe there 
are new dragons to slay."
-  6 -
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Today, the preservation of natural environments 
continues to play an increasingly ambiguous and often 
controversial role in the larger environmental movement.
For some environmentalists Thoreau's claim that "in wildness 
lies the preservation of the world" remains the first 
article of environmental faith. For others preservation is 
not merely a peripheral concern. It is a vulnerable, 
because unjustified, part of the broader environmental 
movement.*
This chapter's review of the controversy over the role 
of preservation will suggest that it stems from the existence 
of significant, fundamental philosophical differences within 
the environmental movement. The charges of anti-preser­
vation critics and pro-preservation rejoinders suggest that 
if everyone is an environmentalist, environmental politics 
makes for strange bedfellows. The various positions 
environmentalists hold on the role of preservation are the 
most obvious manifestation of those differences.
Examining these positions enables one to make crucial 
yet frequently overlooked distinctions between the various 
principles and goals by which environmentalists justify 
their actions. It makes clear that how one views the role 
of preservationists depends upon whether one justifies 
environmentalism by appeals to human survival, to popular
^Daniel E. Kohl, "The Environmental Movement, What Might 
It Be," Natural Resources Journal 15, 1339.
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demands, or to environmental values. Only by critically 
examining these various appeals can an adequate evaluation 
of preservation be made.
Environmentalists who justify the movement as a last- 
ditch attempt at human survival have been a source of 
criticisms of preservationists. For these environmentalists, 
the time spent trying to preserve natural environments 
cannot be afforded. The spirit that motivates preser­
vationists may be admirable, admits such an environmentalist, 
but it is badly misdirected. The gravity of the situation 
demands that efforts be directed at problems which are of 
more immediate concern. In an address to the 11th Annual 
Wilderness Convention, Paul Ehrlich suggested that:
Putting aside a park here and there is laudable, but 
not enough. Unless we attack the worldwide problem, 
putting aside parks is a waste of time. There are a 
great many reasons to be involved in a worldwide 
conservation and population control program. The main 
reason is that we want to live.*
Preservationists would be hard pressed to integrate 
their positions with a movement which only justified itself 
as an attempt to stave off ecological disaster. Although 
the statements of several preservationists have hinted at 
an ecological justification, their claims would be embar­
rassingly meek in the face of the impending cataclysms some
*Paul R. Ehrlich, "Population and Conservation: Two 
Sides of a Coin," Wilderness: The Edge of Knowledge, ed. 
by Maxine E. McCloskey (New York, 1970), 10.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
environmentalists predict. A. J. Rush's argument for
preservation warns that:
When man obliterates wilderness he repudiates the 
evolutionary forces which put him on this planet. In 
a deeply terrifying sense, man will be on his own.^
It has also been suggested that some natural environ­
ments should be set aside as ecologically sane neutral 
zones, safe from man's ecocidal tendencies. Such natural 
environments would provide a relatively untouched gene pool, 
A third frequently espoused claim is that a natural environ­
ment provides a laboratory in which scientists can discern 
the ideal operation of natural laws.^ Some have asserted 
that such natural environments provide models for an
I
ecologically viable society.®
While these claims have a certain validity, they are 
not sufficient to justify preserving natural environments 
in the face of imminent environmental disaster. It is 
doubtful, for example, that the first argument can be taken 
seriously as a suggestion that a new man will evolve again 
from a wilderness gene pool a few billion years after we
'Michael McCloskey, p. 352.
'Robert R. Curry, "Discussion," Wilderness : The Edge 
of Knowledge, ed. by Maxine McCloskey (New York, 1970), 
210-254.
^For a general discussion of the contribution of 
wilderness areas to the ecological sciences, see the Sierra 
Club's The Meaning of Wilderness to Science, ed. by David 
Brower (San Francisco:Sierra Club, 1960).
®Infra, note 9,
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have succumbed to environmental disasters. That scenario 
is not likely to rally frightened thousands to the cause of 
preservation, A response to the second claim might ask if 
preservationists are setting aside areas to which the fortu­
nate few can emigrate after the ecocatastrophe. If that is 
the case the grasslands of North Dakota seem a more prom­
ising sanctuary than the Kapirowits Plateau or the Northern 
Rockies. While proposals for such an ecologically pure 
zone are worthy they do not correspond with the actual 
efforts of preservationists. Finally, the claim that 
natural areas reveal the ideal operation of ecological laws 
is misleading. Idealizing the operation of those laws in
I
natural areas implies that natural laws are somehow flawed 
or being broken in civilized areas. Such a claim is 
conceptually inaccurate. Ecological laws operate as well in 
New York City as they do in the Adirondacks. They operate 
so well that they may prove to be New York City's undoing 
by making human life impossible there. Natural environments 
do provide a useful laboratory for those laws, which in turn 
define the biological boundaries of human survival. But 
suggestions that man should try to simulate the operation of 
those laws in natural environments when reshaping his 
culture do not follow. Cultural norms cannot be extrapolated 
from scientific knowledge. While knowledge of scientific 
laws may reveal the range of viable alternatives, it is not 
.itself capable of pointing to any particular option as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
intrinsically preferable to the others. Such preference 
remains dependent upon the values of those making the 
selection. Thus, scientific knowledge only provides an 
adequate model in those instances where cultural values are 
given.* Since the above claim implies that the virtues 
claimed for wild land research result from the absence of 
human culture, and since constructing a viable human culture 
is the survivalist's chief concern, he should look away from 
wholly natural areas for his models.
It is, of course, likely that a certain as yet unde­
termined number of natural or unmanipulated environments 
must be preserved if the planet's currently teetering 
ecological balance is to be restored. But when applied to 
specific areas and made in the face of imminent disasters, 
that argument loses most of its force and may often be self 
defeating. Preserving Hells Canyon, for example, can hardly 
be justified by a wilderness advocate who makes his appeal 
to survival. Hydroelectric power is much safer than coal 
fired or nuclear powered electrical generating plants. 
Similarly, the logging of forested natural environments 
poses no immediate threat to human survival. In fact,
Wood is a biodegradable, naturally renewable resource 
and requires less energy to process than almost any 
major alternative building or craft materials.'*
*Albert Borgman, "The Humanities and the Environment," 
unpublished paper, '
'“Review of Forests for Whom and for What?, by Marion 
Clawson. Ecology Law Quarterly 5 (1976), 397.
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' It should be cautioned that the object of the above 
discussion is not to discredit preservationists. Its goal 
has been to show the difficulties of making preservation 
more than a peripheral concern for any movement which 
justifies its actions by appeals to survival.
Those who justify their environmentalism by appealing 
to survival are not the only critics of preservationists.
Many environmentalists who are less desperate in their 
appeals also feel uneasy about some of the efforts of 
preservationists. This group will be called "popular 
environmentalists," a label which will be fully explained 
later in the paper. For present purposes they can be 
defined as those environmentalists whose basic philosophy 
is very similar to that of traditional conservationists.
Three of those important similarities are an acceptance of 
the general public's cultural values, a reliance on scientific 
and technical expertise, and a belief that quickly soliciting 
the general public's support for the environmental movement 
is a primary c o n c e r n . In summary, a popular environ­
mentalist accepts the demands of the public as given, and
^^Conservationists are defined here as advocates of 
"wise use" of material resources, not as advocates of 
preservation of natural environments. The term conser­
vationist has recently been used interchangeably with 
preservationist. This paper treats conservation as a dis­
tinct outgrowth of the progressive conservation movement 
of the early 20th Century. See Samuel P. Hayes, Conservation 
and the Gospel of Efficiency (New York: Harvard University 
Press), 19 59 and J. Leonard Bates, "Fulfilling American 
Democracy: The Conservation Movement, 1907-1921,"
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 44 (1957).
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sees his role as determining the best means of effecting 
those demands. He does not see the environmental movement 
as a culturally prescriptive force which advances any 
change in popular life-styles beyond those necessary for 
a healthy environment.
Although acknowledging and sharing the public’s desire 
to preserve a minimally natural environment, popular 
environmentalists have suggested that many recent preser­
vationists' efforts at stopping proposed developments are 
excessive.'* The development of western coal lands, the 
logging of "marginal” wilderness areas, and the construction 
of power plants, hydroelectric dams, ski areas, urban 
freeways and suburban subdivisions are all obviously necessary 
for the pursuit of dominant values. The increasing numbers 
of court cases and administrative review enjoined by 
preservationists are slowing these developments, which are 
seen by popular environmentalists as an inevitable and 
relatively unimportant form of environmental degradation.'*
Much of the popular environmentalist's criticism of 
preservationists' efforts and their resulting vulnerability 
is based on the observation that a large proportion of the
'*This sentiment is a common one. A scholarly legal 
examination of the issue from the perspective of federal 
land management agencies has been made by William Siegel, 
"Environmental Law--Some Implications for Forest Resource 
Management," Environmental Law 4 (1974) 132-134.
1 3Supra, note 2, p. 353.
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preservationists are members of the upper middle class who 
can afford to escape from the city and enjoy natural 
environments.^** The case is frequently made that these 
upper middle class preservationists are imposing their 
favorite form of nature on lower and lower middle class 
recreationists who prefer their nature in more developed 
forms. Due to the preservationists’ superior political 
clout, this imposition has had a success which is now alien­
ating potential support for other environmental "want 
regarding" programs. The criticisms seem based on a liberal 
commitment to equal respect for the aspirations of all 
interests as well as a concern for political expediency.
Another telling charge stems from a concern for social
justice. It questions the morality of locking up timber,
energy, mineral and spatial resources that might alleviate
the suffering of the nation's poor. Mark Sagoff, for example,
has contended that
If the demands of the poor were measured equally with 
the rich, then quicker than you can say cost benefit 
analysis you would have parking lots, condominiums 
and plastic trees.
The sum of these criticisms demands a response. 
Preservationists appear to be a selfish interest group who.
Harry, R. P. Gale and J. Hendee, "Conservation:
An Upper Middle Class Social Movement," Journal of Leisure 
Research 1 (Summer 1969), 246-254; W. N. Devall, "Conservation: 
An Upper Middle Class Movement: A Duplication," Journal 
of Leisure Research 2 (Spring 1970), 123-125.
i^Mark Sagoff, "On Preserving the Natural Environ­
ment," Yale Law Journal 84 (1974), 210.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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while claiming to act in the public interest, actually 
jeopardize eminently sound environmental programs by not 
respecting the desires of others and by exacerbating social 
injustice.
While these charges have been partially countered 
with studies showing that recreational use of natural 
environments is not an upper middle class monopoly,^® and 
that the degree to which preservationists have "locked up" 
the natural resources of natural environments has been 
o v e r b l o w n , charges still carry some force. It now seems 
quite evident, for example, that although the general public 
places a high value on a pastoral northern great plains it 
places greater value on an ample supply of electricity. The 
continuing and probably increasing vulnerability of natural 
environments which contain any material resources is 
suggested by a 1970 study which shows an overwhelming 
majority of the nation's population to be unwilling to forgo 
its consumptive habits for the sake of the environment.^® 
There is little reason to believe the public's priorities 
have changed over the past several years, or that the
**G. H. Stankey, "Myths in Wilderness Decision 
Making," Journal of Soil and Water Conservation 26, 186.
^’David Sumner, "Where Forests Stand," Sierra Club 
Bulletin, May 1976, 45, a review of The Forest Killers:
The Destruction of American Wilderness by Jack Shephard.
i*James McEvoy III, "The American Concern With the 
Environment" in Social Behavior, Natural Resources and the 
Environment edited by William R. Burch, Neil H. Cheek, Jr., 
and Lee Taylor (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 229. 
(Hereinafter cited as Resources.)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 6
public’s material demands on natural environments have or 
will decrease. In view of the continuing consumptive 
imperative, preservationists will probably play an increas­
ingly controversial role in and out of the environmental 
movement. The goals of preservationists and the general 
public will frequently be at odds.
Unfortunately the usual defense of preservationists, 
while not devoid of merit, generally avoids directly 
confronting popular environmentalists' criticisms. In the 
tradition of John Muir, preservationists shrug off charges 
that they are a selfish elite and claim that a natural 
environment has an intrinsic value that stands apart from 
human values and desires. The advocates of these environ­
ments frequently announce themselves to be the interpreters 
of those v a l u e s . A s  a result, the criticism and the 
defense view the same position from totally different 
perspectives, one seeing it as an ultimately selfish 
position, the other as an idealistic, even mystical, 
position which only incidentally serves the interests of the 
actor.
:*See e.g. Sierra Club v. Morton 405 U.S. 727, 741-2,
744-45 (1972) (Justice Douglas dissenting). "Contemporary 
public concern for protecting nature's ecological equili­
brium should lead to the conferral of standing upon environ­
mental objects to sue for their own preservation . . . .  
Those who hike [Mineral King Valley] fish it, hunt it, 
camp in it, frequent it or visit it are legitimate 
spokesmen for the inanimate object."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The recent popularity of the "biocentric perspective” 
and of seeing oneself as "a member of the biological team” 
are justifications out of the same mystical mold.^“
Although the claim of having expanded one's personal 
concerns and feelings to include a consideration of the 
feelings and desires of other fauna and flora does reflect 
a well ,developed environmental ethic, it has yet to be 
determined whether convincing arguments can be developed 
about exactly how nature "wants" to be treated in those 
specific cases where man's desires and nature's "desires” 
conflict.2 1 Until those arguments are developed, or the 
nation shares a collective empathy for nature's "feelings" 
such an appeal is certainly problematic. Just as the 
suggestion that science produces cultural norms which tell
2“This notion seems to be an outgrowth of Aldo 
Leopold's plea for an environmental ethic in A Sand County 
Almanac (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949).
2iSagoff, supra note 15, discusses the flaw in 
claiming to speak for nature. As he suggests, the spokes­
man is left with a free rein to interpret nature's values 
£fs he wills. ". . . Why wouldn't Mineral King want to host 
a ski resort, after doing nothing for a billion years? In 
another few millenia it will be back to original condition 
just the same. The Sequoia National Forest tells the 
developer that it wants a ski lift by a certain declivity 
in its hills and snowiness during the winter . . . and that 
it needs a four lane highway by the appearance of certain 
valley passages and obvious scenic turnouts on the mountain­
side. The seashore, meanwhile, indicates its willingness 
to entertain poor people from Oakland by becoming covered 
with great quantities of sand. Finally, it is reasonable 
to think that Old Man River might do something for a changé, 
like make electricity and not just keep rolling along."
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us how we should live with nature is suspect, the proposed 
injunctions of self-appointed interpreters who claim to tell 
us what nature wants also strains credibility. They inject 
arbitrary dogma about nature into a controversy which is 
difficult enough to resolve when only avowedly human 
aspirations are considered.
Commitments to and defense of the values of natural 
environments need not be so arbitrary. They can be rooted 
in avowedly human desires and be made capable of a reasoned 
elaboration and discussion. An attempt at doing so will be 
made later in the paper. For now it is only necessary to 
suggest that the failure of the traditional preservationist 
response to directly confront the charges of their "want 
regarding" critics or explain their role in relation to the 
larger environmental movement stems from the fact that this 
and several other important dimensions of the issue have 
been overlooked.
*  A *  *  *
The above discussion suggests that a defense of 
preservation which does not question the philosophical 
assumptions of preservation critics is not fully convincing. 
Fortunately, the positions given a rather cursory treatment 
here do not exhaust those which can be held. This paper 
will support yet another perspective on preservation, that 
of reform environmentalism. Reform environmentalism 
comprises a culturally distinct, culturally prescriptive
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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movement whose ultimate objective is to change reigning 
cultural values. It attacks the excessively consumptive 
vision of the good life as responsible for a deteriorating 
quality of life and a sense of alienation from nature. Its 
philosophical base is a blend of a sentimentalized agrarian 
past,^^ a neo Marxist critique of modern industrial society, 
and elements of progressive liberalism. ̂ A l t h o u g h  no 
comprehensive concept of the public interest has yet 
emerged from the movement, two clearly dominant themes are 
a rejection of many modern technologies and a loss of faith 
in market economies. Modern technology and market economies, 
claim reform environmentalists, have thwarted cultural ideals 
which the reform community sees as serving their as yet 
unclear concept of the public interest. These ideals can 
be broadly generalized as a discriminantly consumptive 
life-style and a more natural environment.
This paper will show how reform environmentalism 
readily accommodates and defends what was earlier criticized 
as the misdirected and excessive efforts of preservationists. 
By clarifying the reform perspective, this paper will show
^^Theodore Roszak, Where the Wasteland Ends (Garden 
City, New York: Anchor Books, 1973).
*^Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1964), also, Murray Bookchin, Post Scarcity Anarchism 
(San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1971).
F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: Economics As 
If People Mattered (New Yorkl Harper and Row, 1973).
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how the principles of survivalist and popular environ­
mentalism are themselves inadequate to achieve the desired 
goals of a movement for environmental reform. As a result 
criticisms which are based on those principles lose much of 
their force. The weakness of those critiques will then be 
further demonstrated by developing a reform preservationist 
position and by responding to anti-preservation charges in 
a manner consistent with reform goals.
Finally this paper will briefly review past reform 
movements whose ultimate goals were cultural change and show 
why efforts at preserving natural environments are not 
vulnerable efforts but make a unique contribution to the 
viability of a culturally prescriptive environmentalism.
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CHAPTER III 
PRESERVATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The first task is to penetrate environmental thought 
and distinguish the philosophical underpinnings of reform 
environmentalism from the underpinnings of survivalist and 
popular environmentalism. As suggested earlier the 
environmental movement is not bound by a coherent philosophy. 
After an initial agreement that the mutual concern is over 
man's troubled relationship with nature the movement breaks 
down into a colloidal suspension of justifying principles.^
Before making a successful empirical analysis of the 
environmental movement, it is necessary to construct a 
conceptual framework that can be used to elucidate differ­
ences that are apparently overlooked by most environmental­
ists and lie at the heart of the controversy over 
preserving natural environments. To construct this frame­
work it is necessary to step back from the environmental 
movement to a more philosophical level of discussion.
The underlying question in the controversy over 
preservation is "how does one justify one's position on 
environmental issues?" Some environmentalists appeal to 
survival. The serious failings of such an appeal will be
‘Denton E. Morrison, K. E. Hornbeck and W. Keith 
Warner, "The Environmental Movement: Some Preliminary 
Observations and Predictions," Resources, p. 301.
- 21 -
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discussed later. There are only two justifying principles 
which need be taken seriously here. The use of one of 
those principles was implicit in the charges of those 
popular environmentalists who criticized preservationists 
for impeding developments such as the strip mining of the 
northern plains, a development which is apparently necessary 
for the continuing pursuit of the popular conception of the 
good life. The principle implicit in the charge is that 
one must give the public what it wants. Conversely, the 
brief sketch of the culturally paternalistic reform 
environmentalists suggested that their appeal was to principles 
about what the public should want, not to the public’s 
existing wants.
The important difference between the two appeals is
immediately obvious. Brian Barry has divided the spectrum
of justificatory principles into two categories: "want
regarding" and "ideal regarding." These principles are
relevant to an analysis of the environmental movement.
Want regarding principles . . . are principles which 
take as given the wants which people happen to have 
and concentrate attention entirely on the extent to 
which a certain action will alter the overall amount 
of want satisfaction . . .^
Under such a principle, a public position (and the 
action it implies) makes its appeal and is judged only 
according to its ability to bring about the state of 
affairs wanted by the general public.
*Brian M. Barry, Political Argument (New York: The 
Humanities Press, 1965), p. 38.
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The assumption undergirding want regarding principles 
is that one individual's wants are as good as the next's.
"It is not possible to make moral judgments about the 
intrinsic value of those wants or preferences or to rank 
them in any way."  ̂ The desires of each individual who wants 
increased consumption of electrical energy counts for the 
same as those of each individual who wants a pastoral 
northern great plains, and each have equal claim to 
satisfaction.
The intellectual tradition of want regarding principles 
runs back to the classic liberal theories of John Locke, 
through Benthamite utilitarianism, and on to today's 
welfare economics. Want regarding principles have also been 
institutionalized in our democratic political structure and 
market economy.**
Examples of the want regarding principle are readily 
drawn. When one justifies one's position by reference to a 
law requiring that an area be managed according to the 
Multiple Use Act, one is appealing to the mandate of majority 
wants, as expressed through a legislative body. When an 
administrator refers to a cost-benefit analysis which claims 
that the value of increased electrical power legitimates the 
construction of western power plants, he accepts the value
^Marc F. Plattner, "The New Political Theory," The 
Public Interest 50 (Summer 1975) 127.
‘Barry, pp. 39, 41.
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which the public's demands, as expressed through the 
marketplace, places on increased electric power. The 
assumption of the popular (i.e., those who appeal to a want 
regarding principle) environmentalist critics of preser­
vation is that the legitimacy or value of an action or a 
thing is only a function of the aggregate public desire for 
it.*
An ideal regarding principle is defined by Barry as 
any principle which deviates from a purely want regarding 
position.* Such a principle may demand that particular 
desires be ignored, actively discouraged, or promoted, i.e., 
pastoral environments should be preserved, the desires of 
the public not withstanding. A public action is justified 
by its contribution to the realization of the favored social 
values or goals. One underlying assumption of an ideal 
regarding principle is that some wants and opinions, since 
motivated by superior values, are worth more than desires 
motivated by lesser values, and are consequently more 
deserving of satisfaction, i.e., the value or desirability 
of something is defined independently of the aggregate desire 
for that thing. A second underlying assumption is that, on 
occasion, some people might not know what is best for 
themselves. External guidance is required for some men 
to lead the "best kind of life."
*Ibid., pp. 39-41
*Ibid.
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Depending on its nature and complexity, an ideal 
regarding principle can justify any kind of action. It 
might make an appeal to the cultural despot of Plato's 
Republic, or simply to a constitutional right. A consti­
tutional right, for example by serving as a check on the 
wants of the public as expressed through the legislative 
and executive branches, rests on the belief that certain 
things are too important to be left to the vagaries of the 
majority will.^
The above examples have largely been drawn from insti­
tutionalized instances of want and ideal regarding 
principles. This paper will be more concerned with the role 
those principles play in the period of controversy pre­
ceding the passage of legislation, an appeal to the courts 
or an administrative decision. The discussions in these 
predecision periods are filled with references to "the 
public interest." The distinction between want regarding 
and ideal regarding principles explains at least some of the 
confusion which results when two different positions appeal 
to the "public interest." Does the public interest mean 
that state of affairs which maximizes satisfaction of popular 
wants, subject to distributive modifications? Is it the 
state of affairs desired by a majority frustrated by log­
rolling politics, indifferent bureaucrats, big business, an
’'"Note: Towards A Constitutionally Protected Environ­
ment," Virginia Law Review 56, 458 (1970) 481.
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unsound technology, or corrupted administrators? If either 
of the above examples, it is based on the want regarding 
principle. But if the public interest is conceived as a 
superior state of affairs which might be overlooked or 
undervalued by an unenlightened public, which is the 
conception those interested in reforming values employ, the 
public interest has a meaning quite distinct from the former 
cases.*
There are, then, as indicated by the controversy over 
preservation, three general concepts of the public interest 
appealed to by environmentaists. First a survivalist concept 
claims that it is in the public interest (in both a want 
regarding and ideal regarding.sense) to take immediate, 
perhaps drastic, steps to ensure the public's survival. A 
want regarding appeal demands that the public be given the 
kind of environment it wants. An ideal regarding concept of 
the public interest appeals to the vision of the particular 
kind of society which best serves human needs.
Although these distinctions are hot complex they seem 
to be "glossed over" by the environmental movement. It 
would be difficult to assign particular environmentalists 
to the categories of survivalist, popular or reform environ­
mentalists on the basis of their public statements. It is
®C. W. Cassinelli, "The Public Interest in Political 
Ethics," Nomos V, The Public Interest, ed. Carl. J. Friedrich 
(New York: Atherton Press, 1962) 44-53; also Cassinelli,
"Some Reflections on the Concept of the Public Interest," 
Ethics 59 (1958) 48-61.
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likely that at various times all three types of appeals 
have been implicit in the statements of most. In spite of 
this gloss, the controversy over preservation suggests that 
the movement is capable of crystalizing into the categories 
described here.
The failure of the movement to be more self conscious 
about its philosophical differences is surprising, parti­
cularly from the perspective of reform environmentalism. The 
differences, as followed to their logical conclusions, have 
very different potential outcomes. It can be shown, for 
example, that appeals to survival and to want regarding 
conceptions of the public interest are not likely to achieve
the goals of reform environmentalism.
* * * * *
To attack the position of the survivalists might seem 
rather arrogant. Without a doubt their position is in a 
sense the least controversial one an environmentalist might 
adopt. The choice between living and dying is not contro­
versial. But paradoxically, to justify one's environ­
mentalism on appeals to a survivalist conception of the 
public interest may also serve to minimize the ultimate 
impact of that environmentalism.
If the initial choice left to the nation is simply 
between living and dying, many options may arise once the 
decision is made for survival. An appeal to survival cannot 
then claim a preference for any option which can be shown to
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lie within the parameters of survival. If the ecological 
sciences should reveal that biologically viable societies 
run the gamut from a spotless, stainless steel, smoothly 
functioning spaceship earth,* to a return to the agrarian 
past, the survivalist has eliminated his voice from some 
very important decisions. A more precise appeal is required 
before a more specific solution can be justified.^®
In direct contrast, the reform environmentalist is 
very concerned with the various kinds of solutions which 
might be developed in response to the threats to human 
survival. He advances his preferences on the basis of his 
more specific description of the public interest. By 
criticizing consumptive habits, not simply because they 
threaten survival, but because they are contrary to what he 
claims to be a way of life which would better serve human 
needs, he preserves a voice in the discussion of possible 
alternatives.
The survivalist, however, remains silent in the face 
of misconceived ideals about the good life, ideals which the 
reform environmentalist sees as the central issue. It is an
*Richard Buckminster Fuller, Operating Manual for 
Spaceship Earth (New York: Parker Books) .
^“Many environmentalists assume that physical 
realities will eventually dictate the environmental path 
chosen. See Robert Heilbronner, "Ecological Armageddon," 
New York Review of Books 14 (April 23, 1970) 9, review of 
Paul and Anne Ehrlich's Population Resources and the 
Environment. This paper is taking a dif ferent tack ; this 
tack is discussed in more detail later in the paper 
Chapter IV).
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indication of the survivalist’s prescriptive impotence that 
his calls for change are couched in terms of retrenchment. 
Unlike the reform environmentalist, who offers the possi­
bility of a better life, the survivalist reluctantly 
suggests that we may have to give up our consumptive habits 
if we are to survive. This suggests that those who make 
such an appeal might share the reigning vision of the good 
life.
The controversy over the future of nuclear power 
illustrates the limitations of a survivalist appeal.
Reform environmentalists can question such plants because 
they would be built to serve consumptive habits which are 
not in the best interests of those consumers. Claims that 
the plants will not endanger human life do not eliminate 
the reform critique. The survivalist's position would lose 
its force, however, because it did not confront the con­
sumptive imperative to build the plants. The survivalist's 
appeal is sufficient only if one's concern extends no 
further than preventing the loss of human life. It seems 
obvious that if one's environmentalism includes any concerns 
which do not have clear implications for survival, it is 
advisable to develop a more elaborate concept of the public 
interest.
^^Although one of the general conclusions of Dennis L. 
Meadows et. al.. The Limits to Growth (New York: Universe 
Books, 1972) is that growth values will have to change, no 
moral judgment about those values is made. The general 
tone of the book, however, hardly treats such a prospect 
as a unique and rewarding opportunity.
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An environmentalism which appeals to a want regarding 
conception of the public interest on the other hand also 
fails to address consumptive life-styles. Such environ­
mentalism sees its role as effecting the ideals of the 
public as given, not as the promotion of new ones. As 
in the case of survivalism, the epistemological problems 
encountered by popular environmentalism cover a relatively 
narrow r a n g e . P o p u l a r  environmentalism relies largely on 
scientific, economic and political information. But such 
objective information does not in itself confront or discredit 
any life-style that is consistent with a biologically 
viable society.
An appeal to a purely want regarding conception of the 
public interest assumes environmental problems can be 
resolved through current economic and political institutions 
once the public is more fully scientifically, economically 
and politically informed about the threats posed by pollution, 
unplanned development, clear cutting forests and intensive 
use of chemicals in agriculture. After the voting and /
consuming public is well informed, more rational decisions 
will be made. Such a diagnosis makes the duty of popular 
environmentalism clear. It is to do research, inform, and
1 2See Chapter II, page 5.
^^Albert Borgmann's "Humanities and the Environmental 
Movement" [unpublished paper) discusses limits of natural 
and social sciences vis a vis environmental values. Also 
see E. F. Schumacher's Small is Beautiful New York: Harper 
and Row, 1973) 80-99.
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explain the options available for resolving environmental 
issues.
It is impossible to overestimate the importance of 
adequate information for the entire environmental movement. 
But as necessary as it is, it is not sufficient for an 
environmental reform movement. Daniel Kohl, a member of the 
scientific information movement, recently described its 
dissemination of scientific information as a "profoundly 
political act,"^“ which alerted the public to the often 
self-serving intentions of corporate America. Within 
limits, his analysis holds true. There is no doubt that 
there exist many significant gaps between the aspirations 
of corporate America and the general public. But resolving 
the issues raised by those gaps may not meet the require­
ments of reform environmentalism. Although corporate and 
consuming America may feel differently about the best 
location of power plants and oil refineries, restrictions on 
subdivisions, or types and costs of pollution control, 
rarely do the dialogues in these controversies culminate in 
a confrontation over the public’s highly consumptive habits. 
That plants or refineries Will be built somewhere is rarely 
questioned. Instead the controversies follow the patterns 
of interest-group politics. For example, the residents of 
a region protest that their interest is diminished if a
'^Daniel E. Kohl, "The Environmental Movement, What ' 
Might It Be," Natural Resources Journal 15, pp. 3-13.
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power plant is built in their area. Opposing them, the 
power company claims its interests are best served by 
building in that region, as opposed to a less profitable 
spot. The controversy can be characterized as one concerning 
which interest group will be served in the course of pursuing 
an assumed conception of the public interest, increased 
abundance. Such interest group politics may raise important 
public moral questions about how the cost of industrial 
growth and pollution control should be distributed, but the 
more substantive questions about more ultimate social goals 
are often easily avoided. On the continuing and expanding 
availability of material goods of doubtful real value, the 
interests of corporate and consuming America appear closely 
allied.
Although popular environmentalism may recognize the 
obsessive character of America's consumptive habits, its 
commitment to respecting the aspirations of the public 
regardless of their content limits it to the traditional 
anti-big business rhetoric. The reluctance to address the 
public's desires to expand consumption is revealed in 
criticisms of America's technology and market economy.
These criticisms do not contend that our industrial technology 
is misguided or overdeveloped by consumptive values. In 
this view, technology is simply "stupid" due to a lack of 
technical expertise, corporate irresponsibility, a failure 
to engage in long-range planning, and the absence of ecolo-
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gical information.^® The chief complaint of a want regarding 
perspective about our market economy is not how it aggra­
vates an excessively consumptive vision of the good life, 
but sees the market's major defect as its inability to 
take "externalities" such as pollution into account.
Proper government regulation and incentives cân internalize 
those costs of pollution, spur a "smarter" technology, and 
enable a continued increase in consumption.^®
The concept of a "popular" or purely want regarding 
environmentalism requires qualification. As suggested 
earlier, an empirical review of the environmental movement 
shows that it is not easily broken down into distinctly 
popular and prescriptive elements. The use of those 
categories by this paper has been justified by the interaction 
of those categories in the controversy over preservation, 
not by any conscious alignment on other issues. Environmental 
positions on other issues however, such as those described 
above, can also be described as want regarding. The 
solutions posed in these issues do not call dominant values v 
into question, but simply seek to resolve commonly held
i®John Kenneth Gailbraith, Economics and the Public 
Purpose (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973). Gail- 
braith is strangely ambivalent in his attitudes toward 
consumption in his latest book. Although attacking 
needless consumption in much of the book, he retreats from 
this otherwise firm stand when discussing the environment, 
p. 267.
i®Sanford Race, "The Economics of Environmental 
Quality," Fortune 81 (1970), 120-21.
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environmental concerns. As a result it seems legitimate to 
distinguish want regarding environmentalism from reform 
environmentalism.
Although this paper is not attempting to develop an 
environmental sociology, a few suggestions about the kinds 
of roles and situations which are likely to produce 
"popular", or want regarding positions might prove helpful.
Obviously, want regarding positions are held by those 
opposed to any fundamental changes in popular values, but 
are nonetheless displeased with the current state of 
environmental affairs. This might include a city resident 
whose interest in the environmental movement reflects a 
concern about the smog he is forced to breathe every day, 
but whose interest diminishes when broader concerns are 
discussed. Similarly, the preservationist whose sole 
environmental concern is an uncrowded recreation area is 
not about to suggest any changes which alter his own 
life-style.^ ̂
*^It should be cautioned that the distinction being 
discussed is not that between acting in the public interest 
and out of self interest. The distinction is between 
promoting value change or not promoting value change.
Which of those serves the public interest depends entirely 
upon one's conception of it. A purely want regarding 
conception, for example, would claim the two hypothetical 
individuals above to be acting in the public interest by 
acting "selfishly." The distinction between acting 
selfishly and out of obligation to an idealized concept 
of the public interest is not discussed until Chapter 
Four.
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Popular or want regarding positions also dominate the 
political side of environmentalism. Any environmental 
program or politician hoping for short-term success will 
emphasize their compatibility with dominant values, and the 
minimal impact either would make on consumptive aspirations.
Finally, environmentalists who are committed to 
cultural change find most popular solutions compatible with 
their ultimate goals. This tendency of popular and reform 
positions to overlap is one reason that distinguishing 
between the two is so difficult.^* The difference between 
popular and prescriptive environmentalism remains a real one, 
however, despite the difficulty in assigning it to 
particulars. For example, although the reform environ­
mentalist agrees that objective information is necessary 
for voters and consumers to realize their goals more 
rationally, his chief concern is not only the rationality of 
the public, but also the substance of the ideals that 
rationality serves. If those ideals are the expansion of 
consumptive opportunities, merely providing information 
will not achieve the desired goal. Barring a sudden change 
in public tastes, the most that a purely popular environ­
mentalism will achieve is a tidy, temporarily healthy 
society characterized by a congested, overdeveloped land­
scape, and a spiralling rate of consumption. This scenario
^®A more detailed discussion of the overlapping 
concerns of popular and reform environmentalism is found 
in Chapter V, pages 73-74
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does not match the reform environmentalist’s conception of 
the public interest.
A reform oriented preservationist who accepts criti­
cisms based on a want regarding conception of the public 
interest has failed to consider the limits of such an 
appeal. Attempts at rebutting its criticisms without 
attacking want regarding assumptions overlook the possi­
bilities and requirements of appealing his actions to an 
ideal regarding concept of the public interest. Such a 
conception and the requirements of appealing to it will be 
the subject of the following chapter.
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CHAPTER IV 
A REFORM POSITION ON PRESERVATION
An appeal to a want regarding conception of the 
public interest makes very different epistemological demands 
than does an appeal to an ideal regarding conception. An 
action under a want regarding conception is predicated on 
a hypothetical imperative. If the public wants clean 
streams, then pollution control devices must be developed. 
Justifying one's actions by appealing to public values as 
given only requires empirical investigations. What, 
exactly, does the public want? What information does it 
need to serve those wants? Such problems call for opinion 
polls, improved public input in management decisions, 
holding elections, improving the techniques of technology 
assessment and cost benefit analysis. Once wants have been 
accurately determined and informed the problems encountered 
are, in the broadest sense, technical ones . . . what 
policies, procedures, technologies, and institutions are 
the best means to the end of satisfying public demands?
Grounding one's environmental positions in a want 
regarding conception of the public interest is as much of 
a morally controversial commitment, however, as a position 
grounded in an ideal regarding conception. Although an 
ideal regarding concept requires developing a paternalistic
37-
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position, both concepts are equally evaluative- A
principle which demands that one's actions effect the demands
of the public . . .
is precisely comparable, in its status as a value 
judgment, to identifying the public interest with the 
terrestrial realization of God's will; neither can be 
proved to a skeptic.^
Appealing to an ideal regarding conception of the 
public interest does require investigations of a different 
sort. Such an appeal is predicated on an overtly moral 
injunction. Streams should be clean, the apathy or in­
difference of the public notwithstanding. Like the want 
regarding appeal such an appeal requires a determination of 
the best means to the desired end. But determining and 
justifying that end requires a value judgment about the 
desires for polluting products and the desires for a more 
natural environment. Any defense of such a judgment cannot 
rest solely on technical or scientific knowledge, but must 
ultimately rest on a morally controversial position 
claiming that a particular way of life is superior to 
others. It is the morality of such a claim which elevates 
it from the undifferentiated collection of public demand to 
that of a legitimate appeal to an ideal regarding concept of 
the public interest.
Ĉ. W. Cassinelli, "The Public Interest in Political 
Ethics," Nomos V, The Public Interest, edited by Carl J. 
Friedrich (New York: Atherton Press, 1962), 48.
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The concept of a moral position is crucial to reform 
oriented preservation and requires some explanation here.
It is not sufficient for the reform preservationists 
to reject the public's consumptive desires out of hand. 
Appealing to reform environmentalism's ideal regarding 
concept of the public interest requires the development of 
a moral position which justifies the conviction that the 
general public has overestimated the value of abundant 
electricity and that the demand for it should be discounted. 
It also requires a detailed description of a reform concept 
of the public interest, and an explanation of how increased 
consumption at the expense of preserving natural environments 
conflicts with that conception.
A moral position is not capable of the precision and
confirmability of an empirically based position. One might
even wholly disagree with another's position on an issue,
and still acknowledge that the position he holds is a moral
one. This does not mean that one desire is as good as the
next, or that one desire's claim to recognition as a moral
position is as good as the next. There are certain general
requirements which a desire or position must meet before it
can be identified as a moral position. These general
requirements . . .
enforce the difference between positions (desires) 
which we must respect, although we think them 
wrong, and positions (desires) we need not respect
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
because they offend some ground rule of moral 
reasoning.^
As suggested above, one of those ground rules is that 
a position which claims the superiority of natural environ­
ments to increased electrical power must give reasons backing 
such a claim. There is a distinct difference between a 
self evident value claim such as "good health is better 
than sickness" and an arbitrary claim with which one might 
legitimately take issue, i.e., "reading books is better 
than watching television." A controversial claim must 
explain itself through a "reasoned elaboration." To para­
phrase Bentham, why is poetry better than pushpin? One 
possible reason that poetry might be superior is that it 
provides a challenging activity which promotes a reflective 
incisive mind. Additionally poetry may prove to be a 
vehicle by which a great creative genius will be developed, 
a genius who will make all of our lives richer.^
Valid reasons assume certain theories about what is 
good ("superior," "richer") for the individual.** All 
reasons must at least be capable of such a reference. It 
is not possible to explain why one's desires are better and 
serve the public interest without also defining what one
^Ronald Dworkin, "Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of 
Morals," Morality and the Law, ed. Richard A. Wasserstrom 
(Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1971) 62,
^Ibid., p. 62.
'Ibid., p. 63.
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means by "better." For example, while the reasons just 
elaborated (poetry is superior to pushpin) square rather 
nicely with a value theory which sees man's goal as the 
production of a few brilliant supermen, they do not square 
so nicely with the Christian ideal of humility.
Nor is it sufficient to simply elaborate one's desires 
in a directionless manner. The reasons given must mitigate 
the arbitrary nature of the initial claim that pushpin is 
inferior to poetry. One cannot refer to irrelevant con­
siderations, such as the geographic or economic backgrounds 
of those who prefer pushpin. The concern is with the value 
of pushpin, not with factors which do not touch upon the 
merits of the activity itself. Similarly it is not suffi­
cient as a "reason" to simply claim that "pushpin is 
disgusting." The object of a reasoned elaboration is to 
explain one's emotions not to make reference to those emotions. 
To do so is simply to make another arbitrary statement.®
A second requirement of a moral position is consistency.® 
One's lifestyle and opinions on other matters must reflect 
the avowed sincerety of the belief that preserving natural 
environments is indeed superior to developing them and would 
serve the public interest. Does one's own lifestyle require 
unnecessarily large doses of electric power? Does one try
®Ibid.
®Ibid., p. 66
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to promote and make available the enjoyment of natural 
environments to the general public or does one attempt to 
horde them?
Consistency also requires that one's stands on other 
issues make an appeal to the same conception of the public 
interest. The preservationist who claims that the world 
is threatened by an eco-catastrophe from nuclear wastes, 
yet unaccountably opposes hydro-electric power projects on 
other grounds is guilty of a lack of consistency, either due 
to moral dishonesty or intellectual oversight. In either 
case, such inconsistent stands suggest to the observer that 
the appeal to the public interest is a matter of convenience, 
not conviction.
The following discussion is not an attempt at an 
exhaustive construction of a moral position on preser­
vation. It does hope to guide reform oriented humanists and 
technicians in the construction of such a position. This 
will be done by pointing to the kinds of philosophical and 
technical demands which must be met before a moral position 
on preservation is achieved.
The following discussion will also suggest that a 
reform position makes an appeal to a particular concept of 
the public interest, one which is uniquely effective as a 
response to popular criticisms. The suggested concept is 
rooted in the same tradition of liberal political and moral 
philosophy which conceived democratic and free market
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institutions. Appealing one's position on preservation and 
other environmental issues to the traditional liberal 
conception of the public interest suggests the desire of 
reform environmentalists,to respect many of the values of 
want regarding institutions, and the individual autonomy 
which those institutions promote. It implies that the basic 
objection is not to the principle of individual autonomy but 
stems from a concern about how that principle requires an 
adjustment to meet new conditions.
One characteristic of the liberal tradition is its 
ambivalence about the political community's ultimate moral 
commitment. One strand of liberal philosophy, from Locke 
through Bentham to today's welfare economics, has viewed the 
role of the state from a purely want regarding perspective. 
This strand of the tradition does not deny the legitimacy 
of the positive state, i.e., an active role in economic 
affairs. It simply disclaims the state's role as the 
promotion of a particular kind of individual or culture. 
Another strand, which placed greater emphasis upon the 
substantive ideals of a liberal society, first appeared in 
the early 19th Century in the writings of Von Humbolt and 
were developed by such writers as Mill and Hobbhouse. Their 
attention to substantive ideals was a response to the immi­
nent expansion of suffrage rights to those outside the 
middle class. These theorists developed generalized, yet 
substantive ideals about the kind of life-styles and the kind
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of society that democratic and free market institutions would 
promote. Their claim was that these ideals were the 
inevitable outgrowth of such institutions. Such a sub­
stantive concept of the public interest was necessary to 
justify the existence of those institutions to the large 
numbers of economically unfortunate for whom the benefits 
of "freedom" were as yet unclear.’
One assumed outcome of want regarding economic and 
political institutions was that by placing upon individuals 
the onus of making their own decisions in the political and 
economic marketplaces, want regarding institutions would 
force men to develop their own underlying ideals. Such men 
would become selfconscious enough of their goals to make a 
reasonable elaboration of their economic and political 
desires. These desires would not be arbitrary, pointless, 
or thoughtless. They would be the desires of morally 
coherent, consistent individuals, desires which observed the 
ground rules of a moral position.
The second assumption was that want regarding insti­
tutions, by satisfying the desires of men "following their 
own lights," would produce a society characterized by 
diverse life-styles and communities, challenging experiences, 
and inhabited by men who held the unique aspirations of 
their morally coherent peers in respect.
’C. B. MacPherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in 
Retrieval (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) 4-6.
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In summary, the concept of the public interest used 
to justify want regarding institutions was composed of 
two basic ideals. One claimed that a good society was one 
which promoted the development of men who lead morally 
coherent lives. The other was that a good society was 
composed of diverse groups and individuals which in turn 
enabled a wide variety of individual experiences.
By justifying want regarding institutions with an 
appeal to substantive ideals, the ideal regarding liberal 
philosophers placed the validity of want regarding insti­
tutions in a special light. The implication was that the 
political community could legitimately assume a culturally 
paternal role in instances where the justifying ideals of 
want regarding institutions could not be achieved through 
these institutions. The prospect of a culturally paternal 
role for the state was not thoroughly explored by these 
philosophers, however, due to a third assumption which had 
allowed the original assumption of the congruence between 
want regarding institutions and ultimate goals to be made. 
This third assumption was of the existence of an inevitably 
reciprocal relationship between the two substantive ideals 
which composed the public interest. Men who experienced a 
culture of diverse opinions and life-styles and encountered 
a wide variety of experiences would be more likely to fall 
back on and become aware of the ideals underlying their own
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aspirations. This in turn would engender an ongoing larger 
society of unique individuals and communities.
In the largely romantic pre-technological context of 
the early 19th Century, when hopes for the nobility and 
autonomy of each individual were high, these assumptions were 
not naive. It now seems open to question, however, whether 
the indiscriminate satisfaction of desires in the economic 
marketplace is promoting the kind of morally coherent 
life-styles or diverse society, i.e., the public interest, 
for which that freedom was intended.
The divergence between the traditional liberal concept 
of the public interest and the actual outcome of unchecked 
consumption also serves as a potential springboard from which 
the preservationist convictions about the relative values of 
the competing demands upon natural environments can be 
reasonably elaborated. The divergence is historically 
tracable. Its roots lie in the 17th Century English middle 
class, whose philosophers, particularly John Locke, ex­
pressed the emerging concept of man and the good life, a 
concept which was substantially different from traditional 
beliefs. C. B. MacPherson paraphrases the Lockean description 
of man as:
Essentially an unlimited desirer of utilities, 
a creature whose nature is to seek satisfaction of 
unlimited desires, both innate and acquired. The 
desires could be seen as sensual or rational or
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both. What mattered was that their satisfaction required 
a continuous input of things from the outside . . .®
Under such a view, man’s ideals or ends were to relieve 
any scarcity in that input. The essence of rational behavior 
was held to lie in an opportunity for extensive use of 
natural resources.
Previous concepts of man had stressed a moderate 
appetite for material goods, calculated to serve ideals about 
what a good life entailed. For the energetic English middle 
class, however, busy constructing a new productive system, 
unlimited desire was seen as good in itself, and a necessary 
impetus to ending the evils of scarcity.
The upshot of this new concept of man was a new ideal
of the good life. Jeremy Benthara provided a succinct
description of the new view.
Each portion of wealth has a corresponding portion of 
happiness. Of two individuals with unequal fortune 
he who has the most wealth has the most happiness.®
It is unlikely that the ethos for which Locke and 
Bentham spoke either anticipated or was intended to serve 
as a mandate for the wastefulness and conspicuous consumption 
of modern industrial society. The political and technological 
context in which those ideals came to be effective, however, 
combined with them to contribute to the realization of 
these modern realities.
®MacPherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval, p. 30 
®Ibid., p. 27.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
This consumptive ideal became intimately bound up with 
the growth of liberal individualism and the want regarding 
state. In the want regarding state, specific ideals about 
the kind of life an individual should lead were no longer 
politically promoted. The role of the state was to 
satisfy, either politically or through the market economy, 
the desires of the public as given. Unlike older, pre- 
Reformation political communities, which had articulated the 
ideals consumption should serve, thus making consumption 
subject to moral review, the new view claimed that the 
formulation of those ideals was a private, individual 
matter, outside the sphere of political action. The kinds 
of consumption were no longer seen as actions to be 
politically guided or promoted. It became assumed that 
individual consumptive desires should be satisfied, regardless 
of their conformity to any ideals about what a good life 
entailed. The new emphasis on consumption and the demise of 
politically recognized ideals to which an individual's 
consumption need appeal combined to make satisfying con­
sumptive desires themselves the ultimate, unreproachable end 
of political affairs. Treating men as infinite consumers 
initially served the public interest very well. It inspired 
and was inspired by a market system and industrial technology 
which seemed destined to satisfy many legitimate wants and 
contributed to a diverse, dynamic society which reflected 
the ideals of the ideal regarding liberal philosophers.
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Critics of American values from DeTocqueville through 
today have focused on the transmission of this want regarding 
ethos to America, and the pervasive success it has enjoyed 
here. This is not a claim that all Americans express 
unqualified agreement with Bentham's dictum. It does seem 
likely, however, that most reservations would be based 
upon its oversimplification of the good life, not on its 
lack of essential truth. As a result of the success of the 
want regarding ethos increasing abundance has become 
synonymous with the public interest. How many public figures 
have argued that it is in the public interest to do with 
less or the same, when more is possible? We are, as David 
Potter has suggested, a "people of plenty" for whom 
increasing abundance serves as the unifying social goal. It 
has till now been the least controversial, the most frequently 
appealed to, and invariably the overriding principle of 
public life.I°
Today, however, the flaw in automatically associating 
increased consumption with the public interest has become 
objectified as a monolithic culture of consumers, whose 
indiscriminantly consumptive habits are engendering a sense 
of alienation from nature as well as an increasingly 
environmentally precarious technology.
^“David M. Potter, People of Plenty: Economic Abundance 
and the American Character (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1954). Potter's thesis is that abundance is the dis­
tinguishing and unifying attribute of the American character.
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In the instance of unrestrained consumption, want 
regarding principles have failed to live up to the 
standards of the ideal regarding philosophers. The assumption 
of a reciprocally perpetuating relationship between morally 
autonomous men and a diverse social environment did not 
anticipate the impact of powerful value-shaping forces on 
the social environment. By the default of a political 
tradition which has claimed neutrality on the question of 
what kind of life is the best life, those supposedly 
individually determined ends have been shaped by an 
expanding technology which readily serves a narrow range of 
material demands, while neglecting other needs that are 
equally pressing. The increasing and readily available 
experience of self as a consumer of those goods, and the 
continuing, highly refined inducements of those interests 
who stand to gain from that consumption have combined to 
create a life-style and a concept of the public interest 
which both see increasing consumption as an end in itself. “  
"Cultural laissez faire" has not led to cultural 
diversity, but as did its economic counterpart, a monopoly
^^This theme is a dominant one among philosophers 
popular with environmentalists. Theodore Roszak, Where 
the Wasteland Ends (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1973); Lewis Mumford, The 
Myth of the Machine, 2 vols. (Harcourt Brace and World, 
1967-70); Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1964).
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of highly consumptive v a l u e s . S o m e  have attempted to 
defend the consumptive society by referring to ideals quite 
similar to those of the 19th Century philosophers. The 
claim is that expanding consumptive opportunities "maximizes 
individual c h o i c e . J .  K. Galbraith has appropriately 
labelled such a claim as "the supermarket theory of 
freedom."^** Accepting its validity hinges on how one 
answers the question of whether a society which offers a 
wide variety of deodorants and automobile fashions objecti-
^^Christopher Lasch, The World of Nations (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 293-296. Lasch, in the final essay, 
"The Limits of Cultural Laissez Faire," asks some probing 
questions about the role of individual freedom in the context 
of a technology which appears to be "eliminating" traditional 
biological and social constraints. The secular state and 
individualism had two basic effects. The assertion of 
individual rights for privacy and against the traditional 
constraints of institutionalized hierarchy. "Individualism 
. . . was identified with a revolt against the constraints 
imposed by nature--that is, with man’s increasing domination 
of nature through science and technology. Modern rationalism 
revealed itself not only in the rational state and in the 
vision of a social order based on universal reason but in 
the unprecedented advance of science; and in a culture which 
placed a high value on privacy, self dependence and personal 
fulfillment, it was perhaps inevitable that the achievements 
of modern science should be seen, not as a new stage in man's 
collective self awareness, but principally as another means 
to individual fulfillment and the satisfaction of personal 
wants."
^^See Max Ways, "How to Think About the Environment," 
Fortune 81 (February 1970) 98.
^‘John Kenneth Galbraith, "How Much Should a Country 
Consume?" Readings in Resource Management and Conservation, 
ed. Ian Burton and Robert W. Kates (Chicago and London:
The University of Chicago Press, 1965) 265.
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fies the kind of diversity envisioned by the ideal regarding 
philosophers.
Due to the longstanding congruence of unlimited 
consumption and the public interest the legitimacy of making 
increased consumption an object of political controversy 
is often overlooked. In a community which holds a consensus 
on the high value of consumption, increased material 
abundance is only controversial because of its contribution 
to pollution problems. With the recent introduction to 
public debate of the vision of a post-industrial society, 
the prospect of "having enough" has become a considered 
possibility. Combined with the recognition by an increasing 
number that many further increases in consumption might 
actually work against a concept of the public interest which 
calls for a diverse and challenging culture, it has become 
a legitimate political question. This is particularly true 
in cases where increased consumption actively destroys 
natural environments which can make a strong claim on that 
concept. A political community which ordinarily claims 
value neutrality is hard-pressed to maintain that stance in 
a case of conflicting, mutually exclusive concepts of the 
public interest.
The argued need to rethink the longstanding commitment 
to increase consumption carries additional weight when it is 
considered that the desires for consumption are often offensive
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to the other ideal underlying want regarding institutions.
Many consumptive desires have not offered the reasoned 
elaboration which "consumer sovreignty" was supposed to 
promote. Can an obsessively consumptive life-style honestly 
be defended as "freely chosen by individual men" following 
their own lights, who have had the opportunity to thoughtfully 
consider and experience a wide variety of alternative 
life-styles? The increasingly contrived desire for many 
"necessities" of a consumer society cannot be easily 
defended as instrumental to more ultimate goals. Much 
modern consumption seems arbitrary and pointless and the 
public's desire to increase consumption is not deserving of 
reform preservationist's respect. There is strong evidence 
that the public has lost sight of the value of a morally 
coherent desire, and a diverse, challenging society. While 
such charges are obviously sweeping, their refinement is 
necessary, however, before a preservationist can legitimately 
defend a claim that material demands on natural environments 
should be left unsatisfied.
A moral position on preservation must do more than 
explain its rejection of the opposing position. It must also 
explain the superiority of its own position and explain what 
it means by "superior."
The principal objection that the reform preservationist 
makes to the indifferent satisfaction of arbitrary consumptive
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desires centers on the unnecessary development of natural 
environments that satisfaction requires. Developing those 
environments diminishes the extent to which nature can be 
left to pursue its own ends and results in a sense of 
alienation from the natural world.
Reform ideals require that nature be left untouched 
once it has been sufficiently developed to meet genuine 
material needs. This does not mean that any legitimate 
public interests be sacrificed for the sake of the aspirations 
of nature. It does mean that all human interests requiring 
the development of natural environments be measured against 
an idealized concept of the public interest. Once manipu­
lation is seen as unnecessary to that end, it becomes 
apparent that enlightened human aspirations and those of 
undeveloped nature are congruent. It is determined that it 
better serves the pursuit of the public interest to allow 
the nature in question to pursue its own ends, whatever those 
ends might be­
lt is their uniqueness which serves to define the 
contribution of natural environments to the public interest 
in the most rigorous sense. Unlike the traditional view, 
the goodness or value of natural environments does not 
claim to stand apart from human needs. Their goodness
^®William Leiss, Nature, Technology and Domination 
(unpublished paper), p. 10.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
55
results from the unique opportunities a natural environment 
provides for men to act out of a sense of obligation to 
nature. It is only when men recognize the rights of others, 
both human and nonhuman, and act out of a sense of obligation 
to those rights that they feel as whole moral beings. In 
the same sense that men are rewarded by allowing other men 
the freedom to pursue ends that are capable of a reasoned 
elaboration, we take a similar pleasure in respecting 
nature's pursuit of her own ends. ®̂ This opportunity is 
available in the context of a wilderness experience, in the 
actual attempts of preservationists to save a natural 
environment, in the respect and awe felt for the natural 
phenomena encountered in day-to-day experiences, or in a 
heightened awareness of the implications of one's habits on 
the natural environment. To the extent, for example, which 
men overlook the potential congruence between the aspirations 
of nature and morally coherent men, they lose sight of that 
particular virtue of discriminant consumption. The result 
is a sense of alienation from their natural surroundings and 
from their potential to act as moral beings. Conversely, 
to the extent that men recognize and experience the rewards 
of the congruence between the aspirations of nature and of 
morally coherent men, men strive to be less arbitrary and 
more discriminant in their demands on her.
-^Laurence Tribe, "Ways Not to Think About Plastic 
Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law," The Yale Law 
Journal 83 (1974) 1326-1327.
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The injunction is to treat nature responsibly, as a 
distinct entity, not to actually speak for its aspirations. 
Such an injunction does not require a mystical, bio-centric 
or teleological view of nature. It does require that men 
treat nature as purposeful, as a distinct entity possessing 
an inalienable right once the justified claims that have been 
made on it have been satisfied. That right is simply the 
right to be left a l o n e . A f t e r  that point nature need not 
prove its material recreational or esthetic desirability to 
men. The onus is placed on men to prove the legitimacy of 
human desires which require further development.
Acting out of a sense of responsibility towards nature 
is an ideal which seems to summarize the hopes of many 
environmentalists. It explains the dismay of many preser­
vationists when a natural area is left unprotected because 
of a lack of scenic or recreational desirability. It also 
accounts for the appreciation a preservationist feels for 
those natural environments he will probably never "use.” 
Unfortunately, the tendency in a political community which 
appeals to popular wants and is indifferent to the ideals 
underlying those wants is to rationalize the preservation 
of natural environments by referring only to their service 
to popular values, such as their scenic beauty or their
^^Herbert Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1972) 63-69.
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recreational and research opportunities. All of those are 
legitimate values in their own right. They overlook, 
however, the reform ideal claiming a natural environment 
has a value which gives the preservation of natural environ­
ments a unique claim to the idealized concept of the public 
interest.
The claim that a reform position on natural environments 
makes on the traditional liberal concept of the public 
interest is that natural environments possess a unique 
ability to foster men who search for the ideals underlying 
their desires. They afford the opportunity for men to 
develop a sense of moral responsibility, humility and 
accountability for their actions, a sense which purely want 
regarding institutions once promised to promote.
By meeting the requirements of a moral position, as 
elaborated here, reform preservationist demands for a more 
natural environment make a more legitimate claim to satis­
faction than those apparently arbitrary consumptive wants 
which have not been similarly elaborated. Of the two 
competing demands, only preservationist claims successfully 
appeal to a concept of the public interest which demands that 
all men's desires be capable of grounding in a moral position.
Merely requiring that all competing demands on natural 
environments be capable of a reasoned elaboration is not a 
very substantive concept of the public interest. Obviously 
more substantive ideals are required for resolving conflicting
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legitimate demands. The appeal of reform preservationists 
for a more natural environment makes a strong claim to the 
other basic ideal in the traditional liberal concept of the 
public interest as well. This ideal calls for a diverse and 
challenging culture.
That ideal- has not been articulated in any substantive 
way here, nor can it be in a paper of this scope. It does 
seem to be a fairly sound generalization to say that the 
opportunities afforded by natural environments are varied 
and challenging enough to greatly increase the diversity and 
quality of American life-styles. Their contribution 
certainly seems greater than increased development for 
consumptive demands. In specific instances, however, a more 
detailed description of the public interest is required. 
Without such a description, a convincing case for preserving 
a particular area is only left with rhetorical references to 
those challenging and diverse experiences.
The earlier assertion that the further development of 
natural environments is unnecessary to serve the public 
interest demonstrates the need to go beyond merely referring 
to "rewards" and "challenges" when extolling natural 
environments. How, for example, does one isolate one 
particular development as unnecessary in an interdependent 
economy? Similarly, how does one readily distinguish 
legitimate consumptive desires from arbitrary consumptive 
desires? Consumptive habits and "necessary" developments
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combine to make up a seamless web. It is impossible to 
question a particular habit or development without ulti­
mately having to question a whole complex of habits and 
developments. It is impossible for preservationists to 
attack the car culture for its displacement of farmland and 
urban neighborhoods with freeways and parking lots without 
opening up a variety of related issues. What about the 
needlessly large size of many cars, or their wasteful use, 
or the urban sprawl which makes wasteful use of automobiles 
a necessity? Attacking the car culture also touches upon 
the problem of those thousands whose employment is tied up 
in its perpetuation.
The initial objection carries with it a series of 
related controversies and with them comes the obligation to 
make a consistent stand on issues such as mass transit, 
urban planning and public works projects.
This same interdependent character of the economy 
lends some validity to the charge that preservationists 
are exacerbating social injustice. It is not sufficient to 
respond to the charge by pointing to the needlessly high 
consumption of others. Like the objection to the car 
culture, the objection to needless consumption demands a 
position on a wider program of social change which includes 
a concern for social justice.^®
i®William Bryan, "Toward a Viable Environmental Movement," 
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 10 (1974) 400-1.
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The above examples suggest that it is not a matter of 
simply sloughing arbitrary consumption off the top of the 
public's material requirements. The challenge facing reform 
preservationists and reform environmentalists is the 
articulation of a comprehensive vision of the public interest. 
This vision must distinguish between necessary and arbitrary 
consumption and necessary and unnecessary developments. It 
can only do so by developing accessible social, political 
and economic alternatives combined into a coherent vision 
of the public interest that would enable such distinctions 
to be readily made.
Appealing to such a non-want regarding concept of the 
public interest showing both why and how current consumption 
patterns should be shifted to those which have a much lower 
material requirement. Education, health services, sanitary 
services, good parks and playgrounds, the fine arts, effective 
local government and a clean countryside, for example, appear 
to be viable, promising alternatives which have low materials 
requirements. Of course, the alternatives must also show 
how those goals and the mechanisms employed in achieving 
them are consistent with traditional liberal ideals, ideals 
which rely heavily on the autonomy of the individual.
From a technical point of view, such a task is a major 
one. From the point of view of a moral position, it's an 
absolute necessity. Failing to develop and promote any
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practical alternatives to excess consumption, development 
and social injustice casts doubt on the reform preser­
vationists' claims of not acting selfishly but in the public 
interest. It also suggests that reform preservationist 
goals, even if correct in principle, are not realizable in 
fact.
If the preservationist position were integrated with 
accessible alternatives to current practices, the myopia of 
describing the alternatives as wilderness for the rich versus 
housing for the poor would be exposed. From the perspective 
of a reform concept of the public interest, the want 
regarding alternative means a more opulent abundance of 
needless goods, and a less natural environment. The reform 
alternatives would offer a more natural environment and a 
more equitable distribution of previously developed resources.
This brief elaboration of the preservationist position 
makes an appeal to a coherent moral theory, and undercuts 
the morality of the position of those opposed to preservation, 
or whose consumptive appetites preclude preservation. The 
discussion also gives a broad outline of the kinds of 
arguments and alternatives which must be developed for a 
legitimate liberal defense of "excess" preservation.
In addition to a reasoned elaboration which is capable 
of appealing to a concept of the public interest, a second 
requirement of a moral position on preservation is consistency. 
It is the preservationists' public image in this dimension
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which frequently places the integrity of their position in 
jeopardy, and has precipitated many of the objections to 
their efforts.
The preservationist position only commands respect 
when it is grounded in a life-style which does not itself 
make needless demands on natural environments. It seems 
fair to expect that one willingly lead the kind of life he 
is advocating for others. It is understandable, of course, 
that preservationists might see such individual efforts as 
of little practical worth. The integrity of one's position 
is of little importance in a political tradition which 
satisfies wants indifferently. Additionally, the seamless 
web described above makes the pursuit of a morally consistent 
life, from an environmental point of view, very difficult.
It is nearly impossible to function in an environmentally 
consistent manner in the context of a culture which is 
oblivious to environmental constraints. Nevertheless, it's 
incumbent on anyone who proposes ending needless development 
that he attempt to live and search for ways to live an 
environmentally responsible life. Not to do so belies a 
position asserting that an obligation to nature inspires 
morally coherent men.
If preservationists would become more concerted in 
their efforts to carve out distinctive life-styles, the 
charge that they were elitists who imposed their interests
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upon rights of others would be more easily countered. It 
would be more accurate to describe preservationists as an 
oppressed minority. The self perpetuating, unchecked 
consumptive imperative develops natural environments in the 
process of appealing to a majoritarian concept of the 
public interest which the reform environmentalists do not 
share. If one's life style were consistent with calls for 
a more natural environment, one need admit no benefit from 
increased development of those environments. As a result, 
no genuinely public interest would be promoted. Majority 
ideals would be promoted at the expense of minority ideals.
The above is not a direct response to the charge of 
cultural elitism. Reform environmentalists are avowedly 
paternalistic. But the ideals being appealed to are hardly 
exotic. They are rooted in the same liberal tradition which 
produced the institutions allowing unchecked consumption.
If those ideals were consulted, the demand for equal 
respect by consumptive interests would be seen as mitigated 
by their increasingly arbitrary character. As such they 
forfeit their right to full respect. Those who accept 
those traditional ideals naturally find oppressive the 
resolution of an issue which accepts consumptive desires as 
equally legitimate.
The above is the usual result of preservation vs. 
development disputes in the context of political institutions 
which are essentially want regarding and do not require an
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appeal to a distinct concept of the public interest. In 
such a context, the desires of preservatonists are seen as 
just another "consumptive desire" placed upon a dwindling 
natural resource base. The number of natural environments 
preserved is not based on their superior claim to an 
institutionalized concept of the public interest but is 
simply a function of the number of natural environments the 
public wants preserved vis a vis its consumptive desires. 
For example, the public's desires for preservation were 
expressed through the passage of the Wilderness Act, the 
ensuing wilderness bills, and through agencies duly author­
ized to administer such environments.
Since the value of protecting natural environments 
does not exist independently of public desires for them, 
the onus is on preservationists to prove to the larger 
public and its representatives the value of preservation in 
each particular instance. As a result, preservationist 
efforts have necessarily been piecemeal, and also, due to 
the constant widespread demands of expanding consumption, 
spread rather thin.^®
The lack of institutionalized recognition of the 
values of preserving natural environments has also placed 
limits on the kinds of legal objections that can be made to
^®Michael McCloskey, "Wilderness Movement at the Cross­
roads, 1945-1970," Pacific Historical Review 41 (1972) 355.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
65
the outcome of a legislative or administrative decision.
In the past, these objections have been directed at the 
unsound decision-making procedures employed by natural 
resource administrators.^® In other instances the objections 
have centered on the neglect of relevant information^^ 
and in others the neglect of a substantive statute (NEPA).^^ 
The principle to which the contending parties appeal in 
each of the above disputes is want regarding. Have logging 
interests been given too much influence on the legislators 
or the administrative agency?** Is the public fully and 
accurately informed about the impact of a proposed develop­
ment?*** Are national interests being overlooked in an 
effort to accommodate local pressures?** If every possible 
step has been taken to make certain that the number of natural
*“Charles S. Reich, "The Public and the Nation's 
Forests," California Law Review 50 (1962) 381, 386. Reich 
discusses the need for increasing public input in land 
management decisions to offset input of the commodity 
interests which are established through working relation­
ships with those agencies, infra note 23.
*iSierra Club v. Butz ELR III 20, 292, 20, 293 (9th
Cir Mar. 16, 1973). Plaintiff offered court information 
supporting alternative uses.
**42 use §4321 et. seq., 83 stat. 852, Pub. L.
91-190. See note 24.
2 3Supra, note 20,
**‘The goal of NEPA is more procedural than substantive, 
The act simply requires that environmental factors be 
considered. It does not assign a weight to such factors.
**See Grant McConnel's "The Conservation Movement,
Past and Present," Western Political Quarterly 7 (1954)
472-3.
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environments preserved is an accurate reflection of existing 
public desires, appeals to the want regarding principle have 
been exhausted.
If one's valuation of a natural environment is higher 
than that of the general public's, it is unlikely that any 
of the above disputes will result in wholly satisfactory 
outcomes from the preservationist point of view. The 
apprehensions of many preservationists about relying on a 
highly consumptive public to adequately support their 
efforts is reflected in their recent attempts at conceptu­
alizing a constitutional right to a salubrious environment, 
or as Christopher Stone has suggested, granting legal rights 
to natural objects.** Recognizing such a right protects ah 
ideal that is implicitly "too important to be left to the 
vagaries of the majority will."**
Various intellectual paths have been followed towards 
such a conceptualization. The hypothetical position 
constructed here claims natural environments are protected 
through the projection of the private rights of preserva­
tionists onto those natural environments. The reform 
preservation claim is that those areas are not merely 
instrumental to more ultimate private ideals, such as
*^Christopher Stone, "Should Trees Have Standing?-- 
Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects," Southern Cali­
fornia Law Review 45 (1972) 450.
**"Notes Towards a Constitutionally Protected Environ­
ment," Virginia Law Review 41, 458 (1970) 481.
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recreation or aesthetic appeal, but are the embodiment of 
their own obligation to nature. The claim might be that 
natural areas deserve protection under the due process 
clause of the 14th Amendment by virtue of meeting the 
"personal" and "fundamental" requirements established in 
earlier cases defining such rights.^®
The ramification of recognizing such a right would be 
to shift the burden of proof from preservationists to those 
advocating development. Remaining natural environments 
could only be developed if sufficient public reasons were 
elaborated to justify overriding a private right to 
preservation.^ ®
Although claiming such a right might seem rather 
ambitious, if preservationists met the consistency requirement 
of a moral position in a visible way and were more vocal 
about the sense of obligation underlying their efforts, i.e., 
made a reasoned elaboration, making such a claim would not 
be presumptuous. Courts have been more willing to accept
^®Ibid., pp. 462-3. "Under the substantive due process 
approach . . .  a constitutional right that is solidly 
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment must be both personal 
and fundamental. The personality requirement is designed 
to prevent economic rights from regaining the constitutional 
status they enjoyed earlier in the century. In 'Griswold,' 
Justice Horton averred that the fundamentality of a due 
process right is determined by deference to history, our 
basic societal values, and the doctrines of federalism and 
separation of powers. Similarly, Goldberg said that 
unenumerated constitutional rights must be so rooted in the 
traditions and [collective] conscience of our people . . . 
as to be ranked fundamental."
2 9 Ibid., p . 478.
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such nascent claims to rights in cases where a minority's 
ability to protect such a claimed right is vulnerable. As 
an identifiable minority preservationists could not protect 
their rights, i.e., natural environments, through recourse 
to legislative and executive channels. Yet those minority 
interests would obviously be suffering harm from developments 
which only serve majority ideals.**
The reform position and its concomitant actions outlined 
here would provide a legitimate defense of the supposedly 
excessive efforts of preservationists. The earlier 
criticisms of preservationists remain quite appropriate, 
however, for the traditional defenders of natural environments. 
There is a glaring inconsistency in leading the dominant 
conception of the good life and still advocating the 
preservation of areas which contain material resources. 
Preservation has historically been associated with those who 
combine a desire for outdoor recreation with a highly 
consumptive life-style. From the reform perspective, 
treating the desires of such advocates as mere incremental 
consumptive desires is justified. Unlike those of the reform 
environmentalists such desires cannot be coherently integrated 
with a life-style which is consistent with a more natural 
environment or linked with a program of social and economic 
reform. Perhaps that mystical tradition in which wilderness
3 0 Ibid., p. 482.
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proponents claim to speak for nature and its desires, and 
not for their own, is a reflection of that inability. Such 
an arbitrary defense does not command respect.
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CHAPTER V 
THE ROLE OF PRESERVATION IN A 
MOVEMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REFORM
It is now possible to reevaluate the role of preser­
vation in the larger environmental movement. Environ­
mentalists who appeal to a want regarding concept of the public 
interest are naturally eager to chastise and disassociate 
themselves from preservationists who seem to impede the 
implementation of the public will. A culturally prescriptive 
environmentalist who sees a more natural environment as a 
justified end independent of the public will should not be 
troubled by this. There is a possibility that continued 
efforts at preserving those environments and the dissociation 
from want regarding and survivalist environmentalism it brings 
may prove to be one key to a viable movement for environmental 
reform.
The conflict of the distinctly different concepts of 
the public interest observed when analyzing the exchanges 
over natural environments is less obvious when one reviews 
other environmental issues. At first glance, a reform 
oriented or prescriptive environmental community distinct 
from other environmentalists is not readily discernible.
Except for the well known differences in emphasis between 
Barry Commoner and Paul Ehrlich, the environmental movement 
presents a remarkably united front, free of crippling dissent
-70-
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and confident that the future will vindicate its actions.
Yet the philosophical distinctions that preservation 
controversies put into relief are important and should be 
the object 6f more discussion within the movement. What 
kind of future does the environmentalist hope for? Does 
his role include advocating future goals? Is environmentalism 
a movement to promote a change in the way the public lives, 
or is it simply a problem-solving movement which hopes to 
minimize the degree to which the general public's life-style 
might have to change? Even in the exchanges over natural 
environments, where confronting the differences within the 
environmental movement and the questions those differences 
raise seems unavoidable, the misdirected defenses of 
preservationists show a lack of selfconsciousness about the 
various goals that are implicit. For environmentalists who 
are not interested in promoting new values, glossing over 
these internal differences is not damaging. It's hard to 
imagine a successful movement for cultural change, however, 
whose members are not cognizant of their own unique ideals.
There are assorted reasons for reform environmentalism's 
lack of selfconsciousness. There are, for example, obvious 
psychological benefits to seeing oneself as riding the crest 
of popular sentiment. But though the environmental movement 
is in part a popular movement, it contains elements which 
are something more than that as well. "Environmentalists" 
implies a group with a distinct set of values to most of the
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public. However distorted an image that label might conjure 
up for some, its use does seem to suggest that public 
opinion and environmentalists' opinions are occasionally 
at variance.
Additionally, claiming one's displeasure with majority 
values is not strategically sound in a society that is 
democratic and equalitarian in temper. American history 
shows that those who have assumed paternalistic positions 
on controversial issues have not fared well politically.^
The danger of admitting a paternalistic position becomes 
particularly evident when one considers the kinds of demands 
made by reform ideals. The kind of life-style one leads 
and the kind of goods one consumes have never been considered 
legitimate public concerns. Attempts at changing public 
life-styles are not likely to be well received. Environ­
mentalists and the general public both tend to see such 
questions as matters to be resolved outside the political 
sphere. An avowedly paternalistic environmentalism runs the 
risk of provoking charges that they constitute an elitist 
minority interfering with private concerns.
There are other circumstances contributing to the 
failure of reform environmentalists to set themselves apart
^For a comprehensive view of the dangers of paternalism, 
see Richard Hofstadder, Anti Intellectualism in American 
Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969) ; also see Brian 
Barry's discussion of the "anti-ideals in politics" temper 
of American culture in Political Argument (New York;
Humanities Press, 1965) 80-1.
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from less visionary elements. One is that both reform and 
want regarding environmentalists share short-run goals. 
Although the reform branch of the movement does not share 
the want regarding environmentalist's respect for the public’s 
consumptive aspirations, it does collaborate with those 
environmentalists on most issues. The general public, the 
want regarding and the reform environmentalist are all 
convinced that a safer technology and improved pollution 
control devices must be developed. Population growth must 
remain under control. If subdivisions are going to be 
developed, they should be well planned. The long-term 
productivity of the land must not be impaired. The ecolo­
gical sciences must be more thoroughly explored. None of 
these goals are terribly controversial, all are very 
important and must be achieved. They satisfy the demands 
of the general public and are also consistent with the ideals 
of the reform environmentalist. But by not pointing to the 
existence of divergent ultimate goals, i.e., continuing 
consumption and continued development v.s. more discriminant 
consumption and a more natural environment, these issues 
tend to obscure the difference between popular and pre­
scriptive environmentalism. And when the short-range goals 
of environmental action are agreed upon the problems are 
often seen as mere technical problems, as developing the 
best means to the end of those shared goals. But the problems 
then tend to be diagnosed and solved only in want regarding
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terms, i.e., lack of scientific and economic information, 
technical failures, administrative incompetence, none of 
which hint at the existence of the larger issue, which is 
the nature of the "wants" themselves. As a result, an 
awareness of the important distinction between acting in 
response to public demands and out of an obligation to 
reform ideals is blurred. OT course the general public and 
the want regarding environmentalist feel that resolving the 
above problems is the whole of environmentalism. For the 
reformer, as we have seen, simply giving the public what it 
wants does not complete his areas of concern. He is also 
interested in advancing more ultimate goals.
The problem of developing a more selfconscious reform 
community cannot be resolved by its withdrawal from those 
less controversial environmental problems which are shared 
with want regarding environmentalists and by focusing on 
long-range goals. The reform community also has a stake in 
the solution of those immediate problems, a stake which may 
extend to its own prospects for survival. Remaining 
ideologically pure may be romantically attractive, but in 
this instance it might also prove lethal; only advocating 
more ultimate ideals holds little prospect for immediate 
success.
This should not be construed to be a retreat to a 
survivalist position. In fact, one cause of reform 
environmentalism's weak prescriptive voice might be the
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prevailing assumption within much of the environmental 
movement that value change will take care of itself, that 
the physical fact of a resource shortage or an eco­
catastrophe, either imminent or unfolding, will bring the 
consuming masses, pernicious technologies and market 
economies to their knees. While an eco-disaster would no 
doubt be an effective way to show the superiority of reform 
ideals, it's hardly an event to hope for. This paper has 
made an opposite assumption. Its assumption has been that 
the environmental problems which pose immediate threats 
are solvable in the short run and that our first eco-catas- 
trophe may be postponed "indefinitely" without requiring 
a change in consumptive values. This assumption does not 
reflect a cavalier disregard for the "ecological facts of 
life," but a fear that the public's environmental attention 
span will not extend far into the future, coupled with a 
respect for the short-run competency of the technological 
fix.2
If this assumption is legitimate, immediate environ­
mental problems will be "solved," and the popular environ­
mental movement will become history. What will then be the 
status of reform environmentalism? Reform environmentalists 
will have no choice but to wage the contest on less popular
^The Club of Rome, for example, recently extended the 
time frame in which adequate response can be made to 
environmental threats.
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grounds, on the strength of their reform ideals vis a vis 
dominant ideals. It is difficult to imagine the reform 
environmentalists succeeding in even entering such a debate, 
unless they become more of a community of consciously 
shared goals than the controversy over preservation suggests 
them to be.
The preservation of natural environments might play a 
role in crystalizing such a community. Preservation's 
potentially strategic role is best illustrated through a 
review of past political attempts at changing American 
values. From a reform perspective, a review of the pattern 
those movements have followed is not encouraging.
Culturally prescriptive movements have suffered from many 
of the same difficulties highlighted in the above discussion. 
Populism, Progressivism, the New Deal, the civil rights 
movement, and the recent antiwar movement all contained 
elements which could be classified as culturally prescriptive, 
reform and popular. In all cases, the reform elements were 
frustrated and virtually disappeared.
Past movements have been very "successful" in a 
distributive sense. They have provided the opportunity for 
economically disaffected groups to enter the mainstream of 
America's dominant cultural values. These movements have 
never succeeded, however, in altering those dominant values.
An environmentalist might, in fact, argue that the reform 
tradition has served to aggravate the environmental
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problems we are now facing by extending consumptive values 
to the disaffected groups.* It is not the purpose of this 
paper to explain how these movements eventually extended 
dominant American values, however, but to understand why 
their more visionary elements made such feeble, short­
lived efforts at preserving and extending their reform 
values and goals.
Nineteenth Century populism provides a particularly 
informative example of past failures at sustained political 
attempts to change values. The populist movement of the 
19th Century combined the inchoate indignation of farmers 
and laborers at the chronic poverty of the expanding urban- 
industrial culture with reform elements who envisioned a 
future culture for farmers and laborers radically different 
from the one which was developing.” The source of much of 
the discontent was a farm population whose once significant 
cultural influence and self esteem had eroded as the nation
^Hans Ezhenbergher, "Critique of Political Ecology,"
New Left Review (March April 1974) 10; also Richard 
Hoftstadder, The Age of Reform (New York: Vintage Books,
1955} 18. "It has been the function of the liberal tradition 
in American politics, from the time of Jefferson and 
Jacksonian democracy down through Populism, Progressivism 
and the New Deal to broaden the numbers of those who could 
benefit from the great American bonanza . . . without this 
tradition . . . the American system would probably have 
failed to develop into the remarkable system of production 
and distribution that it is."
“Christopher Lasch, The Agony of the American Left (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969) 5-7.
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became urbanized. When severe economic difficulties became 
widespread in the last quarter of the century, this unrest 
developed into the grange movements, and later, the Peoples 
Party. The immediate targets of the generalized anger were 
railroads, urban banks, and nearly anything or anyone that 
seemed to suggest a retreat from traditional rural values or 
as somehow responsible for farmers' economic problems. The 
rapid growth of industrialism created a disaffected urban 
laboring class as well. Poor working conditions were an 
inevitable product of the fiercely competitive entrepreneurial 
capitalism of the period. Urban areas, growing at an 
incredibly rapid pace, contained immigrant labor class slums 
as squalid as any racial ghettos found in a twentieth 
century city.^
The disaffection of laborer and farmer occasionally 
extended beyond their concern with the immediate economic 
problems to a more detailed critique of middle class values 
and institutions. Henry George* and Edward Bellamy? 
suggested radical institutional changes and a utopian future 
which inspired many Populists. The Peoples Party included 
elements for whom feminism, socialism, and coalitions of
*Ibid., pp. 5-7.
*Henry George, Progress and Poverty (New York: Robert 
Schalkenbach Foundation, 75th anniv. ed., 1956).
?Edward Bellamy, Looking Backward 2000-1887 (Boston 
and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1898).
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poor black and poor white farmers were important concerns.
In rural areas the ultimate hope of the reform element was
to restore the Jeffersonian ideal of the independent, self-
reliant, noncommercial yeoman farmer, while in urban areas
the "Knights of Labor" leadership was:
. . . holding out for a comprehensive rather than a 
piecemeal reform of society, [attacking] economic 
individualism . . ., the morally corrupting effects of 
capitalism, and [holding an] underlying vision of a 
cooperative society.®
Unfortunately for the reform elements the plans for
instituting these ideals were never well developed.
Although the literature of agrarian reform was replete with
predictions of the inevitable failure of the decadent urban
industrial society, practical steps to an alternative
society were rarely developed. Elements of the labor
movement were confident that the inexorable forces of history
would lead to the realization of their ideals. The assumption,
apparently, was that reform ideals would fill the vacuum
when the dominant society collapsed.®
The want regarding elements of the Populist movement
which grew out of the discontent were not far-sighted, nor
were they apocalyptic. They focussed their efforts on
effecting the public's immediate demands. The Farm Bureau




® general discussion of the decline of Agrarian 
Reform Populism, see Richard Hoftstadter's Age of Reform.
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cared little for reforming society in general. Its only 
goal was to solve farmers' economic problems. Samuel 
Gompers' American Federation of Labor was not concerned 
with questions of class solidarity or with establishing a 
a cooperative society, but with the more immediate concerns 
of better working conditions and wages.
Reforms which increased economic opportunities for 
farmers and laborers were relatively uncontroversial and 
could be politically and economically achieved with relative 
ease. Concerns such as preserving a traditional rural 
culture or the sense of community cooperation which the 
Knights of Labor hoped for were not traditionally deemed 
political or public concerns. These goals, unlike economic 
concerns, were traditionally private matters and not readily 
accessible through political action. The want regarding 
elements of Populism passed those concerns over while 
resolving popular, less controversial issues.
In retrospect, it might be argued that the Populist 
movement was a great success. Farmers and laborers have 
become economic interest groups who claim substantial 
portions of the gross national product. Improved farming 
and marketing techniques and technological advances in 
industry have allowed the absorption of farmer and laborer 
into the economic mainstream. Such a happy conclusion
1 0Lasch, The Agony of the American Left, 16-18
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would only be justified, however, if one accepts the analysis 
of a liberal historian that all the Populists wanted was 
"more of the good things in life--the American standard of 
living as it was known in [that] day."  ̂̂ But judged by the 
more ultimate goals of the reform elements of the Populist 
movement, the outcome was terribly disappointing. Modern 
corporate agribusiness does not bring to mind the Jeffer­
sonian ideal of the independent family farm. Organized 
labor is hardly in the vanguard of social change. The 
purpose of this discussion is not, however, to sympathize 
with reform goals, or decry the eventual impact of these 
reform movements on the environment. The relevant question 
asks, what happened to the reform elements and their ideals?
Once the immediate, uncontroversial, popular goals 
were met, public indignation and interest ended. The 
potential grassroots support for reform ideals died with 
the end of the more immediate issues. Secondly, the reform 
impulse died internally as well. Although reform ideals had 
not been politically effected, they had not been precluded 
either. No actions had been taken by the political community 
to destroy labor’s "community," or the farmer’s rural 
cultural traditions. The ideal of selfsufficiency appeared 
to remain an achievable one. It could even have been 
argued that through enhancing the farmers’ and laborers'
*^Richard Hoftstadter, Age of Reform, 130.
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material situation, their prospect of achieving those ideals 
had been advanced.
The end of popular discontent had a disastrous effect 
on the reform elements. They had banked on a general 
collapse of dominant ideals rather than on developing 
accessible alternatives to those ideals.
The impact of these new conditions on reform elements 
was that their liklihood of rapidly gaining enough converts 
to reform ideals to make them political issues was slim.
And without the impetus of impaired self interest the reform 
elements lacked the sense of indignation and hence the 
shared commitment which could survive the long period such 
a task required.
When the environmental movement gained national 
prominance on Earth Day, 1970, one of its members happily 
announced that, unlike past reform movements whose goals 
were of an economic nature and could easily be co-opted, 
environmentalism's noneconomic goals were not so readily 
t w i s t e d . S u c h  optimism is ungrounded from a reform point 
of view. The reform branch of the environmental movement 
should not only be concerned about co-option, but also 
accommodation. Want regarding environmentalism, by not 
actively questioning America's economic goals, is absorbed 
by default and technologically and administratively
i*Dennis Hayes, "Earth Day: A Beginning," The Pro 
gressive 34 (April 1970), 7.
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accommodated. The public's goals for the environmental 
movement are within reach. There are indications that air 
and water pollution have both decreased over the past 
y e a r . T h e  subdividing of rural land may soon by 
"properly planned." Population growth is no longer a 
national problem.
Once the public's immediate concerns are assuaged, 
and confrontations over consumptive life-styles avoided, 
the reform environmentalist will lack a potential consti­
tuency for his more ultimate ideals. Nor will he be able 
to claim that his own life-style is precluded by the 
consumption of others. Once effective pollution controls 
are instituted, the environment becomes "clean" and the 
gross national product can again safely rise, the reform 
environmentalist will be free to return to private life 
and consume as discriminantly as he sees fit. Consumptive 
life-styles will no longer be the object of popular concern. 
The EPA can then join the ICC and FDA in the ranks of self- 
perpetuating bureaucracies which are indifferent to the 
ideals that contributed to their founding.
The demise of the commitment and sense of community 
of reform populists, and the hypothetical demise of the 
reform environmentalists resulted from two key circumstances. 
The public's immediate, short-run demands were met, thus
**The Sixth Annual Report of the Council on Environ­
mental Quality (December 1975) 299, 350.
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making more ultimate, traditionally private goals difficult' 
to politicize. Secondly, the reform communities suffered 
from an inarticulateness which stemmed, in part, from the 
fact that their self interest had not been impaired 
and from the lack of a sense of shared ideals.
There are several reasons for believing that the 
preservation branch of the environmental movement will not 
allow a similar pattern. Controversies over our remaining 
natural environments, however, are likely to continue to 
be prominent issues, issues which are not buried in 
traditionally private spheres but are unavoidably public.
The number of conflicting demands of preservationists 
and consumptive interests on the remaining natural areas is 
constantly increasing. Unlike the demands of the Populists 
or the demands of those opposing pollution the competing 
demands on natural environments are made upon a fixed, 
finite resource base, which can't be technologically expanded 
or administratively resolved. As long as these competing, 
mutually exclusive demands are made and the issue is not 
fully resolved, the dialogue over the merits of the 
competing demands will continue.
A mutually satisfactory solution cannot be achieved 
through compromise since there are simply not enough natural
^‘Grant McConnel, "The New Politics of Conviction," 
Nation 206 (April 8, 1968) 475-76. McConnel discusses the 
physical inability of preservation disputes to be resolved 
through tradeoffs and compromises.
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environments left. As long as the self interests of reform 
environmentalists in regard to preservation of natural 
environments cannot be satisfied, the ideals by which they 
justify that interest will be kept firmly in mind. The 
problem cannot be misdiagnosed as one of administrative 
incompetence, or an inefficient use of natural areas. It 
is obvious that no matter how competently the land is 
administered, or how efficiently it is used, the root of 
the problem, in the eyes of the reform community, will be 
the dominant culture’s excessive material demands. 
Additionally, the political community will be hard-pressed 
to claim a neutral stance on the issue. Every government 
action which tends to promote increased development of 
resources found in natural areas will not be seen as an 
action that is neutral with respect to ultimate ends, but 
will be viewed by reform environmentalists as promoting 
increasingly contrived consumptive "needs" at the expense of 
the realization of their own concept of the public interest.
In keeping with the tradition of falling back on 
technological expansion to satisfy the demands of all 
interests, it has recently been seriously suggested that, 
since the public's desire for natural environments is 
learned, it might be possible to teach the public to appreci­
ate artificial environments.^^ This would enable the nation
isMartin H. Krieger, "What's Wrong With Plastic 
Trees?", Science 179, p. 446.
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to continue its present pace of developing natural environ­
ments while satisfying "amenity" interests as well. What 
such a purely want regarding "solution" overlooks, of course, 
is the reform rationale for preserving natural areas out of 
a sense of obligation to nature itself, not simply because 
of their aesthetic or recreational "desirability."
It may seem odd that the key contribution preservation 
controversies make to reform environmentalism is their 
inability to be satisfactorily resolved. That assertion 
can be understood if one remembers that the reform environ­
mentalist who takes his own ideals seriously sees himself 
as a morally prescriptive force and not a mere selfish 
interest who is only concerned about executing his own 
life plans. The purpose of a prescriptive movement is to 
force a confrontation, dialogue, and choice about the 
competing social goals. This is what controversies involving 
natural areas uniquely succeed in doing.
Preservation controversies are easily politicized.
In the past reform elements have never been able to build 
the political base necessary to make their more ultimate 
ideals a matter of public choice. Populist ideals about 
ostensibly "private" concerns such as rural culture and 
community solidarity could only have been politicized had 
large numbers pressed those demands. Preservation contro­
versies do not have to overcome that hurdle. Since many of
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our remaining natural environments are under public owner­
ship, the competing ideals are already matters of public 
choice. Unlike most traditional ideals, reform ideals on 
nature are physically, publically objectified. The public 
is given a choice between uninterrupted consumption and a 
more natural environment. As a result, both dominant and 
reform concepts of the public interest are held up for 
public review. The issue of what kind of life is the best 
kind of life remains a legitimate public question.
The fact that preservation has already become the 
object of controversy within the environmental movement 
seems to add weight to the above argument. It seems to 
serve as a potential watershed between reform and want 
regarding environmentalism. Unlike pollution control it is 
a soluble problem only in a political community in which all 
accept the legitimacy of other interests and all are willing 
to equally share "resources" with other interests. Obviously, 
there now exist those who have examined their vision of 
the future, decided they cannot respect or accept such a 
resolution, and are continuing to agitate for preserving the 
remaining natural environments. The preservation of natural 
environments is likely to remain such a watershed as long as 
there exist those who treasure such an environment.
This is not a claim that continued appeals for the 
preservation of natural environments insures the success of
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reform environmentalisra. Preservation controversies simply 
provide a common touchstone by which reform environmentalists 
might remain aware of the goals they serve, and the 
existence of others who share these goals. A sense of 
belonging to such a community of shared values and threatened 
interests is necessary impetus for the development and 
promotion of practical environmental alternatives.
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